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“Business, science and ethics: a case study in the necessary evolution of
methodology.”

ABSTRACT
Alasdair MacIntyre and David DeGrazia have explored the question of
how sophisticated dolphins’ cognitive abilities are, and these thinkers have taken
positions based on a flawed methodology that either assert or imply that
dolphins fall below humans when it comes to cognitive sophistication and moral
consideration. Timothy Fort uses MacIntyre’s characterization of dolphins in his
discussion of the value of biology to business ethics. He thereby makes
inaccurate and unsupportable claims, and perpetuates a stereotype about
dolphins grounded in unintentional speciesism—a stereotype that makes certain
unethical treatment of dolphins appear defensible.
There is currently little discussion about the appropriate methodology for
studying ethical issues related to the treatment of nonhuman animals in
business. This essay aims to encourage such a dialogue by identifying and
discussing central weaknesses in the writings of MacIntyre, DeGrazia and Fort
and to argue for a more appropriate methodology.
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INTRODUCTION
Recent philosophical discussions of nonhumans have shown an increased
interest in dolphins. Alasdair MacIntyre and David DeGrazia, for example, have
explored the question of how sophisticated dolphins’ cognitive abilities are. 1
And these thinkers have taken positions that either assert or imply that dolphins
fall below humans when it comes to cognitive sophistication and moral
consideration. Neither thinker specifically addresses the ethical issues related to
the treatment of dolphins by humans in businesses, but MacIntyre’s discussion is
used in the business ethics literature in at least one article by Timothy Fort. 2 This
essay argues that the conclusions of MacIntyre and DeGrazia are tainted by a
flawed methodology, that their accounts of dolphins are scientifically inaccurate
and that a fully informed and objective analysis calls for a more favorable
assessment of dolphins. Because Fort’s essay repeats MacIntyre’s description of
dolphins as though it were accurate and implies a moral status to dolphins less
than the facts support, Fort compounds the error by advancing inaccurate and
unsupportable claims about dolphins and by perpetuating a stereotype
grounded in unintentional speciesism.

David DeGrazia, “Great Apes, Dolphins and the Concept of Personhood,” Southern Journal of
Philosophy (1997: 35), pp. 301-20, Taking Animals Seriously: Mental Life and Moral Status
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), and “On the Question of Personhood beyond
Homo sapiens,” in Peter Singer, ed., In Defense of Animals: The Second Wave (Oxford: Blackwell,
2006), pp. 40-53. Alasdair MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the
Virtues (Chicago: Open Court, 1999).
2 Timothy L. Fort, “A Deal, a Dolphin, and a Rock: Biological Contributions to Business Ethics,”
Business, Ethics and Science, The Ruffin Series, No. 4 (2004) , pp. 81-92.
1
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This matter is particularly pressing because, as I have argued elsewhere,
an ethical analysis of human/dolphin interaction that is free of the
methodological weaknesses of MacIntyre, DeGrazia and Fort (that is, an analysis
based on all relevant scientific research on dolphins and is also informed by
direct contact with dolphins in their natural habitat) reveals that the fishing and
entertainment industries engage in the equivalent of murder and slavery of
intelligent, self-conscious nonhuman persons who have as strong a claim to
moral standing as humans do. 3 However, the dominant methodology pervading
“animal rights” discussions produces a picture of dolphins that implies that
these actions are far less problematic. This essay claims that methodological
weaknesses are among the most important reasons that the unethical character of
these actions is not more apparent to ethicists. There is currently little discussion
about the appropriate methodology for studying ethical issues related to the
treatment of nonhuman animals in business. This essay aims to encourage such
a dialogue by identifying and discussing some of the current methodological
weaknesses and to argue for a more appropriate methodology.

RECENT DISCUSSIONS: DEGRAZIA AND MACINTYRE

The main philosophical discussions at issue are those of David DeGrazia
and Alasdair MacIntyre. DeGrazia has brief treatments of dolphins in his 1996
3

In Defense of Dolphins: The New Moral Frontier (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007).
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book Taking Animals Seriously and his 1997 article “Great Apes, Dolphins, and the
Concept of Personhood.” Dolphins come up again in DeGrazia’s 2006 essay, “On
the Question of Personhood beyond Homo sapiens.” Dolphins receive more
focused attention in MacIntyre’s Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings
Need the Virtues.
Because of the methodological objectives of this essay, and because issues
related to dolphins are neither philosopher’s primary focus, it is beyond the
scope of the current discussion to rehearse and critique every aspect of
DeGrazia’s and MacIntyre’s arguments. (DeGrazia is more concerned with the
moral status of nonhuman animals in general than the moral status of dolphins
in particular. MacIntyre’s discussion of dolphins arises in connection with his
exploration of the relationship between biology and ethics and his argument for
the importance of recognizing the place of vulnerability and dependence in
human life.) Nonetheless, both thinkers include dolphins in their discussions,
they consider a certain amount of scientific evidence related to dolphins, they
take positions on what they see as the philosophical implications of this
evidence, and MacIntyre’s characterization of dolphins has begun to be used in
the business ethics literature. It is appropriate to consider, therefore, whether
these particular inferences are warranted.
Moreover, because DeGrazia and MacIntyre conclude that, in comparison
to humans, dolphins fall short in a variety of important cognitive abilities, these

5

Between the Species, IX, August 2009, http://cla.calpoly.edu/bts/

two writers’ discussions imply that certain questionable human actions towards
dolphins could be morally defensible. Because an ethical analysis that is free of
the methodological weaknesses of approach these thinkers use reveals the
actions of the fishing and entertainment industries to be clearly wrong, DeGrazia
and MacIntyre unwittingly provide a defense for morally questionable actions.
Second, I believe that the methodological weaknesses we see in these
writings are representative of many discussions in the “animal rights” literature.
Accordingly, if I am right, no small number of positions regarding nonhumans
regularly advanced by ethicists—positions that typically fall to the disadvantage
of nonhumans—are unwarranted.
The number of nonhumans used or affected by human businesses is, of
course, huge, and what is at stake is generally the life or death of these beings.
Even if we were to limit our consideration only to nonhumans who have
demonstrated self-awareness and significant levels of cognitive and affective
abilities (albeit a suspect and anthropocentric limitation), thousands of large
whales, dolphins, chimpanzees, gorillas and elephants are killed or used as
objects every year in the search for profit by a variety of industries. If, as I claim,
consideration of the ethical defensibility of the practices at issue is based on a
methodology so weak that it virtually guarantees inaccurate results, this is a
serious matter indeed.

6
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THE PROBLEM: FAULTY METHODOLOGY
The methodology that we see in DeGrazia and MacIntyre’s discussions of
dolphins has three specific weaknesses. 4
•

First, philosophical conclusions are regularly based on claims about
dolphins that range from doubtful to false.

•

Second, the methodology is uninformed by direct observation of
dolphin social intelligence in the wild—a critical element in assessing
the cognitive and affective capacities of dolphins and, therefore,
dolphins’ moral status.

•

Third, the methodology fails to recognize the philosophical
implications of profound differences in the evolutionary history of
humans and dolphins—and thereby uses anthropocentric standards in
determining the cognitive capacity and moral status of dolphins.

1. POSITIONS BASED ON INCOMPLETE OR QUESTIONABLE EVIDENCE
One of the most basic problems with the positions of DeGrazia and
MacIntyre is that they proceed from insufficient familiarity with the relevant
scientific literature. As a result, the conclusions about dolphins are based on an

For a related discussion of serious methodological weaknesses, see my “Menschen und Delfine:
Ein Versuch über Anthropozentrismus in der angewandten Umweltethik,” Deutsche Zeitschrift
fuer Philosophie. Band 52 (2004), Heft 4: 603-616.

4
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understanding of dolphins that is incomplete, questionable or false. The
following examples are simply four out of many that could be cited. 5
a. Traits of “sound practical reasoners”: MacIntyre identifies three traits
possessed by “sound practical reasoners”: “[the] ability to detach
themselves from the immediacy of their own desires, [the] capacity to
imagine alternative realistic futures, and [the] disposition to recognize
and to make true practical judgments concerning a variety of kinds of
good.” 6 In other words, MacIntyre refers to three abilities that we find
in normal adult humans but don’t observe in, for example, cats and
dogs: 1) we do things for reasons other than satisfying physical
pleasure; 2) we consciously realize that some reasons for doing things
are better than others, and we can choose our actions accordingly; and
3) we can project the consequences of our actions into the future.
MacIntyre, however, makes a series of mistakes when he argues that
dolphins lack these abilities. First, MacIntyre’s argument seems to
proceed on the questionable belief that if we cannot observe dolphins
performing these activities in the same way that is recognizable when
humans do them with language, then dolphins lack those abilities.

In order to keep this paper within a reasonable length, I will give a fairly detailed (although still
not exhaustive) account of only one point in the philosophical discussions at issue—MacIntyre’s
claim that dolphins lack the traits of “sound practical reasoners.” However, each subsequent
point could be illustrated with similar specificity.
6 MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals, p. 96.
5
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Second, MacIntyre offers his conclusions with insufficient knowledge
about dolphin capabilities. Whether dolphins possess language or not,
there is reason to believe that they do have the three abilities that
MacIntyre refers to. To cite just three brief examples.
 Since the 1980s, a community of wild Atlantic spotted dolphins
has sought out human contact in the Bahamas. Their
motivation is apparently curiosity about another intelligent
species, which strongly suggests that they are capable of acting
for reasons that have nothing to do with the normal physical or
social life of their species. 7
 Dolphins appear to have the capacity to choose to act for
different types of reasons. They can act out of self-interest
(when they eat). They can act to advance the interest of their
coalition or community (when they engage in certain
cooperative behavior). They can act to help not only other
dolphins, but humans as well (when they perform care-giving
behaviors). They even appear to be able to act out of curiosity
(when they seek out human interaction). Given what seems
reasonable to speculate on the basis of dolphin behavior,
dolphins appear to have the abilities MacIntyre is referring to.
7

For research on this community of dolphins, see the work of Denise Herzing.
9
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(MacIntyre appears to be referring simply to an ability more
advanced than what we see in human children. He writes: “The
first step in this transition [to rationality] takes place when a
child becomes able to consider the suggestion that the good to
the achievement of which it is presently directed by its animal
nature is inferior to some other alternative good and that this
latter good therefore provides a better reason for action than
does the good at which the child has been aiming.” 8 A simple
example that seems to qualify would be when we realize that
there are better reasons for treating other people decently than
that, if we don’t, they may punish us. I believe that care-giving
behavior with no apparent reward to the dolphins giving it
suggests that dolphins act for reasons that are better than the
self-interest characteristic of human children.)
 Research by John Gory and Stan Kuczaj on strategies that
dolphins use in solving problems suggests that dolphins can
imagine the future. 9

Dependent Rational Animals, p. 56.
Stan A. Kuczaj II and Rachel S. Thames, “How Do Dolphins Solve Problems?,” Zentall & E.
Wasserman (Eds.), Comparative Cognition: Experimental Explorations of Animal Intelligence. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2006. John D. Gory and Stan A. Kuczaj II, “Can Bottlenose Dolphins
Plan their Behavior?” Paper presented at the Biennial Conference on the Biology of Marine
Mammals, Wailea, Maui, Hawaii, November – December, 1999.

8
9
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In one experiment, three clear plastic containers were placed in
the pool fairly close to each other. In all three of them, when the
dolphin dropped a weight into the top, the food compartment
opened. In two of the containers, the weight would then fall to
the tank floor—where it could be used again to open the food
compartment of one of the other boxes. But in the third, the
weight would fall into an obviously closed bottom—making it
unavailable.
Kuczaj and Gory wanted to see if the dolphins could
understand the implication of having both open-bottomed and
closed-bottomed containers—that is, to get the maximum
amount of fish, use the open-bottom container first. The
scientists theorized that if the dolphins understood this, they
would plan their behavior accordingly. Bob and Toby were run
through six thirty-trial blocks. From the first block onward,
both dolphins used the container with the closed bottom last—
suggesting that they could solve a problem by projecting the
consequences of different strategies into the future.
b. Undeveloped brain capacity: DeGrazia’s discussion of research on
dolphin linguistic abilities reveals the highly questionable assumption
that dolphins who have not received language training in human
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scientific studies possess an “undeveloped capacity” which, if
developed, will dramatically increase the complexity of their mental
life. That is, DeGrazia appears to suggest that for 15 million years, the
dolphin brain contained cognitive potential that remained untapped
until dolphins began being studied by humans. Given how
biologically expensive the brain is for mammals to support, DeGrazia’s
interpretation is highly unlikely. Unfortunately, DeGrazia ignores the
research on the social intelligence of wild dolphins, which provides
impressive evidence for sophisticated cognitive abilities that are fully
developed. This includes evidence for a sophisticated communication
system among Hawaiian spinner dolphins discovered by marine
scientist Kenneth Norris. 10
c. Dolphin brain research: Particularly troubling is the failure by either
philosopher to consider the implications of research on the dolphin
brain. Certain differences in the evolution and structure of human and
dolphin brains, and empirical measures such as the encephalization
quotient of the dolphin brain undercut the idea that dolphin cognitive
abilities are as limited as DeGrazia and MacIntyre suggest they are. 11

10 Kenneth S. Norris, Dolphin Days: The Life and Times of the Spinner Dolphin (New York and
London: W. W. Norton, 1991).
11 On the dolphin brain, see, in particular, the work of Lori Marino. For example, Lori Ann
Marino, “Brain-Behavior Relationships in Cetaceans and Primates: Implications for the Evolution
of Complex Intelligence,” Ph.D. Dissertation, State University of New York at Albany, 1995;
“Convergence of Complex Cognitive Abilities in Cetaceans and Primates,” Brain, Behavior and
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Indeed, dolphin brain research suggests considerable cognitive and
affective potential.
2. LACK OF DIRECT OBSERVATION OF WILD DOLPHINS
The second weakness of the current methodology is that DeGrazia and
MacIntyre have not observed dolphins in the wild. By never acquiring the
perspective that comes from observing dolphins in their own habitat, these two
philosophers lack a critical perspective that would let them, for example,
evaluate the significance of published scientific research. Not having this
perspective puts one in an intellectual position roughly equivalent to someone
studying Plato who cannot read Greek and must rely on translations. Moreover,
the cognitive and affective capacities of dolphins are much more evident (and far
richer) in the wild than in captivity. By observing dolphin social behavior in the
wild, one acquires an indispensable perspective that helps frame the results of
scientific studies and to form one’s sense of the type of beings that dolphins
are—and what their moral status should be.
To cite just one example of how familiarity with wild dolphins would
have influenced DeGrazia’s and MacIntyre’s philosophical positions:
•

Both thinkers discuss the significance of Louis Herman’s work with
two dolphins on the comprehension of an artificial language.

Evolution (2002) 59:21-32; and Patrick R. Hof, Rebecca Chanis and Lori Marino, “Cortical
Complexity in Cetacean Brains, The Anatomical Record (2005) Part A 287A:1142-1152.
13
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However, because DeGrazia and MacIntyre have had no direct
exposure to wild dolphins, they are insufficiently familiar with the
social intelligence of wild dolphins. As a result, these philosophers fail
to recognize that the most important fact about the performance of
Herman’s dolphins is that it occurred in what marine scientist Denise
Herzing calls a “foreign cognitive environment.” 12 That is, when one
views Herman’s results against the backdrop of 1) the complexity of
dolphin social intelligence in the wild and 2) the absence of any close
parallel to human language among wild dolphins, the performance of
Herman’s dolphins suggests a degree of cognitive flexibility that is not
only remarkable, but far beyond the cognitive limits that DeGrazia and
MacIntyre ascribe to dolphins.
3. ANTHROPOCENTRISM: BRAINS, LANGUAGE AND INTELLIGENCE
Humans and dolphins have very different evolutionary histories. Failure
to understand the significance of this difference, however, leads thinkers like
DeGrazia and MacIntyre to use anthropocentric standards in assessing the
capacities of dolphins.
For example, these two thinkers’ discussions of dolphin “intelligence”
give considerable attention to the question of whether dolphins demonstrate an
exact parallel to human language. MacIntyre and DeGrazia make linguistic
12

Denise Herzing and author, “Dolphins and the Question of Personhood,” p. 75.
14
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abilities central to their assessment of the intellectual capacities—and, by
implication, moral status—of dolphins. (DeGrazia, for example, contends that
only the acquisition of language allows for the “complexity of thought”
necessary for personhood, so he relegates dolphins to the category of “borderline
persons.”) However, such an attitude fails to consider the possibility that human
language is a product of the coevolution of the brain and hand. 13 Such a theory
means that the evolution of the cetacean brain took a different path than the
human brain did. Evidence of advanced cognitive abilities in dolphins, then,
would surface in something that probably would not exactly parallel human
language but would nonetheless perform the same functions (e.g.,
communication and analytical and creative thought) in the life of these marine
mammals. Indeed, at least two prominent dolphin researchers consider it quite
possible that dolphins do in fact employ something similar to language. 14

Frank Wilson, The Hand: How Its Use Shapes the Brain, Language and Human Culture, (New York:
Random House, 1998); David F. Armstrong, William C. Stokoe, and Sherman E. Wilcox, Gesture
and the Nature of Language (Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995; W. H.
Calvin, W. H., “The Unitary Hypothesis: A Common Neural Circuitry for Novel Manipulations,
Language, Plan-ahead, and Throwing.” In Gibson & Ingold, eds, Tools, Language and Cognition in
Human Evolution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993. Pp 230-250.
14 On the basis of Denise Herzing’s ongoing, 21 year study of a community of wild Atlantic
spotted dolphins, she believes that wild dolphins “employ a capacity (the details of which have
yet to be identified) that is equally as cognitively complex as the human capacity for language
without being analogous in structure and form.” (“Dolphins and the Question of Personhood,”
Etica & Animali. Special Issue on Nonhuman Personhood. 9/98, p. 75.) Dolphin brain specialist
Lori Marino expands on this possibility when she notes, “I think that it is entirely possible that
dolphins have something akin to language and that part of the reason why they have such large
brains is because they have a very complex communicative system. The reasons I think this is
because it provides an explanation for their prodigious artificial language abilities. Also, I think a
complex social life may require a language-like system. Additionally, the fact that we are having
a difficult time decoding the dolphin communication system hints that there is more there than
meets the eye. For instance, the fact that we cannot find a strict correlation between most dolphin
13
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Similarly, appreciation of the difference in the environments in which
humans and dolphins evolved raises the possibility that there may even be a
significant difference between our two species in the concept of the “self.” Harry
Jerison, a specialist in the evolution of the human brain and intelligence, has
proposed that dolphins might have evolved a sense of self that is qualitatively
different from what we experience as humans—and one that is fundamentally
social. 15
The failure of DeGrazia and MacIntyre to directly engage the significance
of the different evolutionary histories of humans and dolphins leads them
unintentionally to apply a human standard to a very different species. That is,

whistles and context suggests there could be the property of displacement. To date, no one has
figured out what the unit of information is in dolphin whistle repertoires or even if they perceive
their whistles in that way. Brenda McCowan has applied information theory to dolphin whistle
repertoires and has uncovered interesting evidence that there is more structure there than in
many other mammal repertoires.” Private communication.
15 Jerison writes, “In the human species, the most remarkable of the constancies created by the
brain may be the constancy of the self as observer. For us, the self is the firm, permanent object to
which external events are referred. There is integrity of the body image, and only rarely (in the
absence of neuropathology) is there a serious question of what is and is not part of the self . . ..
The self is constant in time as well as space: We change as we age, of course, and yet we ‘know’
that we remain the same. This and other intuitions about the self are so strong that it is difficult
to imagine a creature with information processing capacity comparable to ours, equal to us in
intelligence, as it were . . ., that has a differently constructed self. However, if we accept the
constructed nature of the self, and the likelihood that it is this kind of construction that is one of
the benefits of (and explanations for) an enlarged brain, we should consider the possibility that it
might be on such a dimension of a model of reality that other large brained species might have
evolved significantly. Unless there were remarkably parallel evolution, it is also on such a
dimension that dolphins are most likely to be dramatically different from us, because they are
likely to use their processing capacity in species-typical ways, just as so much of the processing
capacity of the human brain is used in controlling species-typical human language.” Harry J.
Jerison, “The Perceptual World of Dolphins,” in Dolphin Cognition and Behavior: A Comparative
View, eds. Ronald J. Schusterman, Jeanette A. Thomas and Forrest G. Wood (Hillsdale, NJ:
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1986), p. 148.
16
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these thinkers unintentionally apply anthropocentric criteria to cetaceans—a
move that, not surprisingly, leaves dolphins coming up short.
Implications for business ethics: Timothy Fort
As mentioned at the outset of this essay, even though neither MacIntyre
nor DeGrazia relates his conclusions about dolphins to any issue in business,
their positions have important implications for business ethics. In fact,
MacIntyre’s characterization of dolphins is used in Timothy Fort’s “A Deal, a
Dolphin, and a Rock: Biological Contributions to Business Ethics.” Thus,
MacIntyre’s error is already being compounded.
Fort’s essay is a response to Paul Lawrence’s Ruffin Lecture. Fort’s
general aim is “to reinforce the reasons for welcoming . . . scientific findings to
the field of business ethics.” 16 He introduces dolphins into his discussion via his
claim that “in order to optimally integrate biology [to business ethics], . . . and to
address the notion of how one balances various biological drives . . . , we should
also remember to draw upon the dolphin in each of us, that part that takes
pleasure in doing moral acts.” 17
Fort is largely concerned with the contributions of biology to the problem
of “the extent to which human beings are able to consciously balance the four
drives [identified by Lawrence: Acquisition, Bonding, Learning, and Defending]
16
17

Fort, “A Deal, a Dolphin and a Rock,” p. 81.
Fort, p. 81.
17

Between the Species, IX, August 2009, http://cla.calpoly.edu/bts/

and, in particular, the appropriate level for comparing evolutionary notions to
organizational theory.” Dolphins are cited as “highly intelligent creatures with a
sophisticated means of communication” whose hunting practices lead them to
experience “pleasure and pride.” “The dolphin,” writes Fort, “in some way,
emotionally connects with the rule of behavior beneficial to the dolphin and its
school. The sentiment is reinforced by a ‘feedback’ mechanism of food itself.
What is important, it seems, is that prelinguistic communication of information
and of feelings of emotion are present in highly intelligent animals.” Speculating
that “perhaps our biological nature is attuned to certain sentiments that human
brain wattage is able to translate into notions of duty and obligation,” Fort
concludes that there is “a need to attend to the dolphin in us and to nourish
communities that provide the flesh and blood experience that refines sentiments
into virtues.” 18
There are three problems with Fort’s comments about dolphins.
•

First, his characterization of dolphins is based on the uncritical
acceptance of MacIntyre’s inaccurate account, and this leads him to
make inaccurate and unsupportable claims. Fort repeats MacIntyre’s
assertion that dolphins are “prelinguistic” and therefore lack the
ability “to provide reasons for what they do.” 19 Citing MacIntyre’s
application of Aristotle, not a marine scientist, Fort then portrays

18
19

Fort, pp. 83, 89.
Fort , p. 89.
18
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dolphins as beings whose most significant trait appears to be
experiencing pleasure from performing complex tasks that benefit the
group—that is, that they “take pleasure in doing moral acts.” 20 Claims
about the internal emotional states of marine mammal, however, are
largely unsupportable—even if they’re suggested by Aristotle. The
additional claim that the pleasure comes from “moral acts”—not
simply “acts that benefit other members of the community”—raises so
many problems that the statement must be discarded from Fort’s
discussion. Precisely what are the traits of “moral acts” in this context?
Do we mean “moral acts” from a human perspective? From a dolphin
perspective? Are they one and the same? Different?
•

Second, the contrast between what scientific research has revealed
about dolphins and Fort’s portrayal of them cannot be overstated. At
best, Fort’s characterization of dolphins is so incomplete and
unflattering that it is like describing humans as beings whose chief
virtue is that we feel pleasure when we cooperate with others to cook a
meal. Sadly, I believe that it is more accurate to say that Fort’s
characterization of dolphins is not unlike the purportedly objective
and scientific accounts that “proved” the inferiority of women,

Fort, p. 89. MacIntyre writes that “like human beings, dolphins take pleasure in those activities
which are the exercise of their powers and skills. When Aristotle says that there is pleasure in all
perceptual activity and that the pleasure supervenes upon the completed activity, what he asserts
seems to be as true of dolphins as human beings.” MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals, p. 26, n.
13.
20
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African-Americans or any group that has been the target of serious
discrimination. In effect, Fort’s characterization of dolphins
perpetuates what is actually a stereotype grounded in
anthropocentrism. Dolphins are not simple, happy, playful mammals
who are the equivalent of “Lassie of the sea.” The scientific evidence is
now strong enough to support the claim that dolphins are, like
humans, self-aware, intelligent beings with emotions, personalities and
the capacity to control their actions. Dolphins should be regarded as
"nonhuman persons" and valued as individuals.
•

Third, because Fort is unfamiliar with the relevant scientific literature
on dolphins, he fails to recognize that there are much better examples
about dolphins that he could use to advance his argument without the
disparaging stereotype of dolphins. Fort is looking for an important
example among nonhumans of consciously balancing the drives of
acquisition, bonding, learning, and defending. The appropriate
examples for this in the lives of dolphins, however, lie in arenas that
more fully demonstrate a very sophisticated level of social intelligence:
helping behavior, communication, problem solving, child rearing,
division of labor, the management of conflict, political alliances,
nourishing relationships, etc. 21

21

In Defense of Dolphins, passim.
20
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By repeating MacIntyre’s inaccurate account of dolphins, Fort not only
unintentionally perpetuates a stereotype grounded in species bias, he also tacitly
endorses a fatally flawed methodology in business ethics. Ethical evaluations
that involve nonhumans must be based on, at the very least, personal familiarity
with all of the relevant scientific literature—not on the uncritical acceptance of a
secondary authority who is not even a scientist.

CONCLUSION: SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATION
Fundamental weaknesses in the discussions of DeGrazia and MacIntyre,
then, are: that these philosophers consult much less scientific research than they
should; that they lack a perspective that exposure to wild dolphins would give
them; that a lack of appreciation of the significance of the different evolutionary
histories of humans and dolphins leads these two philosophers unintentionally
to apply anthropocentric standards in their evaluation of dolphins’ cognitive
abilities; and that, as we’ve seen in the case of Timothy Fort’s essay, they can
serve as a basis for perpetuating inaccurate and disparaging characterizations of
dolphins. As a result, DeGrazia, MacIntyre and Fort advance conclusions that
attribute an inferior status to dolphins and reinforce a picture of dolphins that
not only is scientifically and philosophically inaccurate, but implies that the
deaths, injuries and captivity of dolphins that go on each day in the fishing and
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entertainment industries are less ethically questionable than an analysis free of
these weaknesses would demonstrate.
Unfortunately, these methodological weaknesses are not limited to the
discussion of dolphins. Martha Nussbaum, for example, includes a rare
discussion of the proper method for investigating the ethical claims of
nonhumans in her recent Frontiers of Justice. 22 However, she identifies only
“theory and imagination” as critical elements. That is, she fails to discuss the
importance of a strong scientific foundation for philosophical investigations.
The solution that I would recommend for the problem this paper describes
is, no doubt, clear—philosophers, ethicists in general and business ethicists in
particular who explore issues related to nonhumans need much greater
familiarity with the relevant scientific literature and direct exposure to the
species under study in its natural habitat. However, it is important to recognize
the far-reaching implications of following such a recommendation. Realistically,
this means that research on the ethical implications of the scientific research on
nonhuman animals is no longer just an “armchair” enterprise. This means that
ethicists should participate, at least as observers, in scientific field-work. This
means closer contact with scientists that has been traditional—to the point that
ethical inquiries should be informed not only by published research, but also by

22Martha

C. Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 2006.
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relevant, ongoing scientific investigations. 23 Admittedly, ethical research of this
sort will be more difficult to do than in the past, and it will take more time than
has traditionally been the case to bring philosophical inquiries to fruition. I trust,
however, that I have illuminated the hazards involved in not adopting such a
rigorous methodology. In view of the fact that the contact between humans and
nonhumans in business activity regularly involves the death of the nonhumans, I
also hope that the importance of adopting an appropriately rigorous methodology
is clear.

23 Gory and Kuczaj’s extremely important findings on dolphin cognitive abilities are a case in
point. It is true that when DeGrazia published his earlier work (1997) and when MacIntyre
published Dependent Rational Animals (1999), Gory and Kuczaj’s work was not yet published.
Their first paper was 1999. However, their preliminary findings were known among marine
scientists. My hope is that, in the future, philosophers working on issues related to nonhumans
would establish lines of communication that would allow such research to come to their
attention.
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